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Abstract 
Measures of governance and stateness have grown substantially in number over recent decade, and 
gained also greater importance in building public discourses and orienting decision-making processes. 
Yet there seems to be little agreement on what exactly these measures represent. This paper claims 
that the proliferation of metrics can only be understood against the conceptual hybridity and 
indeterminacy in which the notions of governance and stateness have entangled. To frame this 
‘creative disorder’, the first part of the paper introduces the current debate on measuring governance 
and stateness. The second explores the sematic fields of the two concepts, while the third one provides 
an overview on existing measures and methodological questions. The fourth part explores normative 
demands and policy prescriptions linked to this production and the fifth section analyses in depth three 
different measures: The Rule of Law Index, the Sustainable Governance Indicators and the State 
Fragility Index. The sixth part concludes by summarising the relevance of exploring both conceptual 
and normative challenges in the use and production of these measures. 
Keywords 
Governance, Stateness, Measures, Indicators, The Rule of Law Index, Sustainable Governance 
Indicators, State Fragility Index. 
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1. Introduction1 
The academic discourse on governance became central in political science and international relations 
in the late 1980s, when the demise of the bipolar world order foreshadowed the emergence of new 
political structures, actors, and mechanisms of government bypassing traditional categories of the state 
and central authority. In this context, the term ‘governance’ gained prominence as a theoretical 
approach and concept that grasps the different aspects of this transformation of state power. 
To differentiate governance from government and/or governing, many scholars emphasised the 
type of actors on whom steering functions are vested. Rosenau pointed out that, while governance was 
by definition ‘always effective in performing the functions necessary to systemic persistence’ 
(Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992), government succeeded only when the formal state authority was 
capable of enforcing decision-making. Following the network focus of governance, many scholars 
have also explored the role of corporations (Wilkes, 2004) or non-state/private authorities (Hall & 
Biersteker, 2002). Again others underlined that governance implied a plural framework of actors, in 
which it ‘is not what the state does that is different, but how it does it’ (Richards & Smith, 2002).  
During the 1990s, the concept became particularly prominent within EU studies to describe the 
changing nature of the state under the conditions of supranational political integration. As such, it 
served as an antipode to classical notions of ‘government’ and hierarchical steering, i.e. to describe the 
emergence of largely non-hierarchical, co-operative decision-making structures including non-state 
actors. Table 1 summarises a way of differentiating between government and governance, considering 
differences on politics, policy and polity. This ‘governance turn’ (Rosamond, 2000, p. 110) was also 
accompanied by a strong focus on aspects such as administrative capacity, bureaucratic functioning, 
and institutional capacity.  
Table 1 Government vs. governance 
 Government 
State vs. market resp. society 
Governance 
State, market and networks as 
complementary forms of steering 
Polity  Focus on the state 
 Majoritarian democracy and hierarchy 
as most important institutions 
 Institutional structure, which combines 
elements of hierarchy, negotiation systems 
and competition mechanisms 
 Networks 
Politics  Competition between political parties 
for acquisition of power and between interest 
groups to gain influence 
 Conflict regulation by decision of 
responsible state organs and enforcement of 
official decisions 
 Conflicts between governing/leading 
and governed/affected actors 
 Steering and co-ordination within 
institutional steering systems  
 Negotiations between state and/or 
societal actors 
 Adaptation of institutional steering 
systems 
Policy  Legislation (order and prohibition) 
 Distribution of public goods 
 
 Agreement (within networks and 
communities), compromises, barter 
 Co-production of collective goods 
 Network management 
 Institution building (management of 
institutional change) 
Source: (Umbach, 2007, p. 37); translated version of Benz 2004, p.21. 
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While the concept of governance was especially prominent in the context of EU, administrative and 
public policy studies, it also found its way into the development discourse in the mid-1990s, and, later 
on, into the international organisation framework. Yet, despite its academic dispersion into IR studies, 
its related empirical and theoretical consolidation was missing and, like the concept of sustainable 
development, it rather seemed to turn into a catch-all phrase for political processes at global level and 
a ‘fetish’ (Levi-Faur, 2012) used to refer to everything and anything (Bevir, 2010; Finkelstein, 1995) 
in global policy-making . 
The academic omnipresence of the term to some extent derives from the clime of transition and 
uncertainty in which the features of governance have emerged. Levi-Faur (2012) points out that the 
governance discourse was a functional reaction to a crisis of governability. Scott (2009) claims that the 
discourse of governance was stimulated by the need to create a new, pervasive and pragmatic 
approach to capitalism, marked by the ‘destatisation’ of the political system (Jessop, 1997). 
Governance in fact represents an important asset of the discourse on modernisation around the neo-
liberal economic agenda. According to Fine (2009, p. 12) ‘in place of the amorphous but at least single 
notion of modernisation, there has been the proliferation of developmental terminology, from good 
governance through to corruption, each element of which has to be critically unpicked across rhetoric, 
etc, to make any sense of what is being said or, possibly more important, being done’. 
Because of these numerous definitions, the conceptual consistency of governance remained blurred 
and the term gained various meanings and functions. Governance has been defined through categories 
such as ‘order and disorder’ (Levi-Faur, 2012) or forms of collective action, ‘inherently 
comprehensive of both government and civil society’ (Lynn, 2013, p. 13). Even if governance was 
meant to build a bridge between different disciplines (Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004), the governance 
literature did not actually bridge the gap between different discourses. Finally and particularly 
important in the context of this paper, the capacity of differentiating between proxies, types, qualities 
and categories of governance is still an open challenge. Two decades after the emergence of the 
governance concept on the academic agenda, a number of theoretical and methodological questions 
remain open to discussion.  
Yet, over the life cycle of the concept, a new theoretical debate re-shaped the course of the ‘old’ 
governance debate. After a decade in which it theoretically replaced reflections on the role of classical 
state authority, the state re-emerged as a key conceptual reference point within international relations 
in the new millennium (Bhuta, 2012). With the escalation of the Global War on Terror, the 
international community began to address the problem of ‘state weakness’ and brought the academic 
discussion back to measuring the conditions for the survival of the state. The ‘collapse’ or ‘failure’ of 
states in Africa and the Middle East were considered a crisis of governance producing threats to the 
global security. The perception of these threats reinforced the search for good governance instruments 
and indicators and hence interlinked the two conceptual arenas of governance and stateness. As a 
result, many practitioners and scholars directly relate state weakness with the discourse on 
governance.  
In view of these developments and challenges, also the proliferation of different measurement 
innovations further complicated the consistency of the governance-stateness nexus. Against this 
background, the present paper aims to map the literature on governance and stateness indicators in 
order to explore strengths and weaknesses of the current debate. It provides an overview on the 
production of governance and stateness indicators and explores the extent to which major 
methodological trends reflect a set of conceptual uncertainties. Its fourth part explores potential 
normative demands and policy prescriptions linked to their production. The fifth section analyses the 
conceptual construction of both governance and stateness indicators, considering three different 
measures (The Rule of Law Index, the Sustainable Governance Indicators and the State Fragility 
Index). The sixth part concludes by summarising the relevance of exploring the conceptual and 
normative context of these measures. 
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2. Measurements of governance  
There are few terms in social science and in practice (Bovaird & Löffler, 2003, p. 316) that are as 
vague as the governance concept. Yet, definitions, theories, and measures of governance have still 
grown substantially in number over recent decade. The term governance has attracted a pluralist 
connotation both in the academic and public debate and scholars, institutions, and stakeholders have 
provided as many definitions as to turn the term into a mixed bag of notions, aspects, and attributes.  
Also measures of governance have proliferated during the last decades. Also within the debate on 
measuring governance, there seems to be little agreement on what exactly governance means. Based 
on the conceptual cacophony, the present paper hence claims that the problem of measuring 
governance derives from the problem of defining governance and its boundaries. Therefore, it states 
that the proliferation of indicators can only be understood against the conceptual hybridity and 
indeterminacy in which the notions of governance have entangled. To frame and explore this ‘creative 
disorder’(Kooiman, 2003), the present sub-chapter attempts to reconstruct the conceptual meaning of 
governance. Following Adcock and Collier (2001), it attempts to distinguish between background and 
systematised concepts. While the background concept captures a number of meanings associated with 
the terms (connotation), the systematised concept is the result of a theoretical selection and 
interpretation (denotation). 
1.1 Episteme and definitions  
In order to reconstruct the systematised meaning associated with the concept of governance, Table 2 
illustrates a set of definitions of governance provided by international organisations. It shows the 
multiple interpretations of the term ‘governance’, in which the core essence of the concept 
substantially varies from one provider to the other. As a result of this multiplicity, measures of 
governance have been operationalised as diversely as processes (governance as a tool) and structures 
(governance as a form); inputs (governance as both structure and process, bureaucratic and 
administrative capacity), and outputs (governance as policies, outcomes, consequences and results).  
Table 2 Definitions of governance 
Institutions Definitions Characteristics 
EC ‘Governance represents both the rules, process, and behaviour that affect the way in 
which powers are exercised at the European level, particularly as regard to openness, 
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence’(European Commission, 
2001). 
Input (Process and 
Structure) 
WB Governance concerns ‘the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate 
and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them’ (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011, p. 222). 
Input (Process and 
Structure) 
OECD ‘Governance is the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority 
necessary to manage a nation’s affairs’ (OECD, 2014). 
Input (Process) 
UN ‘In the community of nations, governance is considered “good” and “democratic” to 
the degree in which a country’s institutions and processes are transparent’ (United 
Nations, 2014). 
Input (as Quality of 
institutions and 
Process) 
The European Commission, for instance, adopts a subjective (Curtin & Wessel, 2005) definition that 
sees governance as input that encompasses ‘both the rules, process, and behaviour that affects the way 
in which powers are exercised at the European level, particularly as regard to openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence’ (European Commission, 2001). For the OECD indeed, 
governance is more a process, i.e. ‘the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority 
necessary to manage a nation’s affairs’ (OECD, 2014). The World Bank adopts the systemic-input 
dimension to define governance as the procedural and structural set of ‘traditions and institutions by 
which authority…is exercised’ (Kaufmann et al., 2011, p. 222). The UN finally sees governance as a 
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process, and emphasises its instrumental function in promoting democracy: ‘In the community of 
nations, governance is considered “good” and “democratic” to the degree in which a country’s 
institutions and processes are transparent’ (United Nations, 2014). 
Theoretically, governance is generally understood as a form of rule without formal government 
(Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992), i.e. as a set of regulatory mechanisms implemented without the classical 
tools of state regulation. However, the literature does not agree on whether governance is a process or 
a structure, neither whether it should be operationalised through input nor output indicators. As 
summarised by Umbach (2007) in Table 3, governance can be defined using either a process-related 
perspective or one that is focussed on structure.  
Table 3 Governance- Structure vs. Process 
 Process-oriented 
 
Structure-oriented 
In a broad sense Hierarchical co-ordination 
 Authoritative instruction 
 Majoritarian decision-making 
 
Non-hierarchical co-ordination 
between public and private actors 
 Negotiation 
 Conviction 
 
Regulated self-steering (in the shadow 
of hierarchy) 
 
 
Societal self-steering 
Hierarchy/State/bureaucracy 
Independent regulatory authorities 
Supranational institutions 
 
Networks 
Tripartite negotiation systems 
Public-private partnerships 
 
 
Neo-corporatist negotiation systems 
Federations, Interest groups 
 
Community/Clan 
Market (spontaneous order, anarchy) 
In a narrow sense 
“New” modes of 
governance in 
networks 
 
Non-hierarchical co-ordination 
between public and private actors 
within processes of arguing and 
bargaining 
Networks 
Tripartite negotiation systems 
Public-private partnerships 
 
Source: (Umbach, 2007, p. 37) translated and amended version of Börzel, 2005, p. 622.  
In the process-oriented perspective, governance is understood ‘as the continuous political process of 
setting explicit goals for society and intervening in it in order to achieve these goals’ (Jachtenfuchs & 
Kohler-Koch, 2004, p. 99). In terms of activities it defines governance as ‘hierarchical coordination, 
non-hierarchical co-ordination between public and private actors, regulated self-steering and societal 
self–steering (cf. Börzel 2005:622)’ (Umbach, 2009, p. 40). ‘In a second understanding, governance 
encompasses the structural dimension of policy-making as a (new) ‘form of social order’ (cf. Börzel 
2005:617)’ (ibidem, p. 41). The ‘structure-oriented perspective [indeed] includes different mechanisms 
of co-ordination and patterns of interaction of interdependent political and societal actors, 
institutionalised steering systems, collective action within institutions, strategic coalition-building and 
the implementation of decisions taken by networks, tripartite negotiation systems, public-private 
partnerships, and/or interest groups (cf. Benz 2004a:25; Börzel 2005:618ff.; Fürst 2004:48)’ (ibidem).  
Both above governance perspectives have influenced the formation of governance indicators. Yet, 
the divergence between input and output perspective still represents a point of vivid discussion within 
(Rotberg, 2014) and beyond the literature. While input indicators refer to both the structure and 
process, i.e. how governance is implemented, output indicators indeed take into consideration the 
consequence of governance in a broad array of sectors. In terms of policy steering, over the past two 
decades, the measurement of governance has become highly significant in judgments about aid 
allocation to developing countries. While some actors lamented that output indicators provide very 
little guidance on why a given country is performing well or not, others criticised the attempt to 
approach governance through the bureaucratic setting of resources invested (ibidem). However, both 
The difficulty of measuring Governance and Stateness 
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strategies are functional and serve different purposes (measuring the quality of governance or its 
systemic functioning). Instead of arguing about the legitimacy of one solution over the other, more 
attention should be paid to using these instruments according to their focus and scope. Many 
practitioners in fact evaluate the quality of governance by using indicators of the functioning or 
bureaucratic organisation of the state, while others, who aim at defining governance from the 
structural or process-oriented perspective, actually use performance indicators to operationalise their 
understanding of governance
2
.  
2.2 Measures of governance 
During the 1990s, the measurement of governance has acquired a type of rationalising function, 
aiming to liberate the concept from both theoretical and conceptual uncertainties. Within this 
rationalisation process, as a result of the exponential increase of proxies (corruption, rule of law), 
attributes (good governance) and correlated variables (democracy, development) the term governance 
has accumulated a deep connotative capacity, but only a spurious denotative understanding (Levi-
Faur, 2012). To summarise this plurality, Table 4 presents some of the most important measures of 
governance provided by international organisations and stakeholders. Two different strategies of 
measurement will be considered more closely in order to exemplify different approaches to 
governance indicator production. 
2.2.1 Mono-dimensional measures 
On the one side of the production, many indicator providers approximate the value of governance 
through indirect, mono-dimensional proxy measures. Mono-dimensional measures account for a single 
aspect or dimension of governance, while multi-dimensional indices integrate different representation 
of the same phenomena in the same measure. For instance, mono-dimensional metrics of governance 
include three typologies of measures focusing on: the administrative capacity (i.e. the World Justice 
Project’s Rule of Law), the quality of political institutions (i.e. the Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index), and the relationship between state and society (i.e. Freedom House’s 
Freedom in the World).  
Freedom in the World, for instance, is an annual index of political rights and civil liberties, 
launched in 1972 by Freedom House. It represents the first measure of freedom used to capture the 
level of governance. Since 1995, Transparency International started producing the Corruption 
Perception Index, one of the most popular and widespread indicators of corruption used as proxy for 
measuring governance. Moreover, during the 1990s, the discourse on governance frequently merged 
with the discourse on poverty reduction, development, and anti-corruption. In 1997, the UN 
Development Programme launched the Human Development Index, broadly considered as either a 
measure of development and human wellbeing. This index is an aggregate measure of human 
development based on six variables and available for 187 countries (2012 edition). However, no clear 
specifications are made about the relationship between these variables. Given the ambiguity of the 
governance definition, no governance indicators had been included in the original Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) context (Kaufmann & Penciakova, 2010).  
Many mono-dimensional measures of governance also capture the quality of political institutions. 
The strengthening of (good) governance has been a key pillar of the democratisation process 
undergone by post-colonial states during the 1980s (Weiss, 2000). Within the UN agenda for 
democratisation (Boutros-Ghali, 1996) the ‘right to democratic governance’ established a sort of a 
‘global guarantee clause’ (ibidem) according to which the international community should sponsor and 
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 This is the case of the World Bank, which conceptually emphasises the administrative and structural infrastructure of 
governance, but in practice, use performance indicators, to operationalise the Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
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support the diffusion and consolidation of constitutional democracies (Halperin & Lomasney, 1993). 
In light of these normative targets, the production of governance indicators was indispensable to 
measure the transition towards modern economic and political institutions (Cooley, 2014). However, 
governance was also instrumental to outline the path to modernisation and to guide the development 
aid strategies of donor countries. As result, governance indicators have focussed on measuring some of 
the most important aspects of democratic regimes. 
Table 4 Measures of governance 
Name Producer Mono/
Multi 
dimen
sional 
Focus AIM Cov
erag
e 
No. 
of 
vari
abl
es 
Bertelsmann 
Transformati
on Index 
(BTI) 
Bertelsmann 
Foundation 
Mono- Quality of 
institutions 
‘The BTI is directed at the normative goal of a 
market-based democracy... The BTI emphasizes 
the same values that underlie the European 
Union’s integration process: a representative 
democracy under the rule of law combined with a 
socially responsible and sustainable market 
economy (Stiftung, 2005, p. 4)’. 
129 2 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index 
Transparency 
International 
Mono- Administrati
ve capacity 
‘Raising public awareness of corruption’ 
(Lambsdorff, 2007). 
176 13 
Freedom in 
the World 
Freedom 
House 
Mono- Quality of 
institutions 
‘Analyse the challenges to freedom; advocate for 
greater political and civil liberties; and support 
frontline activists to defend human rights and 
promote democratic change’ (Freedom House, 
2014). 
2 195 
Global 
Integrity 
Index 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
Multi- Quality of 
institutions 
‘To assess the existence and effectiveness of 
mechanisms that prevent abuses of power and 
promote public integrity, as well as the access 
that citizens have to their government’ (Global 
Integrity, 2014). 
43 300 
Legatum 
Prosperity 
Index 
Legatum 
Institute 
Mono- Global 
wealth and 
wellbeing 
 
‘Assessment of global wealth and wellbeing’ that 
attempt ‘to understand how we move 'beyond 
GDP'’ (“The 2013 Legatum Prosperity Index,” 
2014). 
142 89 
Sustainable 
Governance 
Indicators 
Bertelsmann 
Foundation 
Multi- Sustainabilit
y 
‘SGI thus targets the spectrum of those 
individuals who formulate, shape and implement 
policies, from political decision-makers in centres 
of government and the democratic institutions of 
the OECD and EU states, to representatives of 
civil society and international organizations, to 
scholars and interested citizen’ (Schraad-Tischler, 
& Seelkopf, 2014, p. 2).  
41 67 
The Country 
Policy and 
Institutional 
Assessment 
World Bank Multi- State fragility ‘The quality of a country’s present policy and 
institutional framework. ‘Quality’ refers to how 
conducive that framework is to fostering poverty 
reduction, sustainable growth and the effective 
use of development assistance’ (The World Bank 
Group, 2011, p. 1). 
78 16 
The Rule of 
Law 
World Justice 
Project 
Mono- Administrative 
capacity 
(effective 
exercise of 
authority) 
‘The WJP Rule of Law Index is intended for a 
broad audience of policy-makers, civil society, 
practitioners and academics, and aims at 
identifying strengths and weaknesses in each 
country under review and at encouraging policy 
choices that advance the rule of law’ (World 
Justice Project, 2014, p. 188). 
99 43 
 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
World Bank Multi- Quality of 
national 
governance 
‘Assessing a measure of governance originally 
devoted to create cross-country indicators of 
governance and to establish more effective 
instruments of government assistance’ (The 
World Bank, 2007b). 
215 340 
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Since 2003, also the Bertelsmann Foundation provides a Transformation Index (BTI) accounting for 
the political transformation towards democracy (129 countries). The BTI is made up of two indices: 
the Status and the Management Index. While the first accounts for economic and political 
transformation, the second is based on indicators of government performance.  
2.2.2 Multi-dimensional measures 
The production of governance indicators also resulted in multi-dimensional indices that summarise a 
large amount of data and information. The World Bank (WB) has created one of the first of these 
multi-dimensional measures of governance, the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). 
Launched at the end of the 1970s, the CPIA measures the quality of policies and institutional 
frameworks
3
, in order to guide the investments of the International Development Association, the US 
financial institution that offers loans to developing countries. In 1997, also Freedom House begun to 
calculate a multidimensional measure of governance, the Nations in Transit (NIT) index, a measure 
that aggregates data available on the transition toward democratic institutions undertaken by former 
communist states in Europe and Eurasia. One of the most widely used multi-dimensional composite 
measures of governance is the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). It is created by the WB and 
aggregates different data sources within six dimensions
4
. The WGI were launched in 1996, on the eve 
of the baptism of the international discourse that interlinked development, governance, and 
democratisation. As result of this new emphasis on a combined perspective, the WGI aim to provide a 
more complete and actionable vision of governance. They are in fact based on strong policy-making 
objective, creating the diagnostic tools to steer foreign assistance, and to determine country eligibility 
to aid programmes. The latest version of the WGI is based on 340 variables, and it is available for 215 
countries (edition 2013). With this measurement tool, the WB was the first to inaugurate multi-
dimensional composite measures of governance
5
.  
Other institutions have provided multi-dimensional measures of governance using a set of qualities, 
categories, or attributes (prosperity, sustainable and competitiveness) to better define the nature of 
governance. In 1980, a UK based commercial provider launched the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), an index of risk assessment composed by 30 indicators and available for 140 countries. Since 
2000, also the World Economic Forum (WEF) published the Global Competitiveness Report that, 
based on two indices (Business Competitiveness Index and the Growth Competitiveness Index) 
explores the relationship between governance and income. Since 2010, the Legatum Institute provides 
the Legatum Prosperity Index, a composite index of wellbeing and prosperity, calculated for 142 
countries and based on 8 clusters of indicators. More recently, the Bertelsmann Foundation launched 
the Sustainability Governance Indicators that are build on three indices (the Policy Performance 
Index, the Democracy Index and the Governance Index) aggregating 67 indicators for 41 countries 
(edition 2014). 
2.3 The semantic field of Governance 
Moving into the semantic field of governance the relationship between indicators of governance and a 
set of associated phenomena (such development, government, state, and corruption) cannot be easily 
understood. Figure 1 presents Sartori’s levels of abstraction (Sartori, 1970), applied to concept of 
governance. 
                                                     
3
 The CPIA is based on 16 variables grouped in four clusters: (a) economic management; (b) structural policies; (c) 
policies for social inclusion and equity; and (d) public sector management and institutions. 
4
 Voice and Accountability, Political Stability/Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule 
of Law, Control of Corruption. 
5
 Since 2007, the WB has yet also introduced new ‘Actionable Governance Indicators’, based on mono-dimensional 
measures that, focusing on specific aspects each, are better designed to assist policy-making. 
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Figure 1 Governance: up and down the generality 
  
 Up the Ladder 
 
 
   
 Background Concept 
 
 
  
  
 Down the Ladder 
  
Moving down the ‘ladder of abstraction’ (ibidem.), many indicators have tended to approach the ‘real’ 
meaning of governance focusing on sub-dimensions or specific sectors within which governance is 
supposed to operate. The Corruption Perception Index for instance is a mono-dimensional index of 
governance, and measures of a specific sub-dimension. However, the prescriptive function of the 
indicators often obfuscates their descriptive function. Many indicator providers and institutions in fact 
agree that fighting corruption and promoting development is instrumental to improve ‘good 
governance’. Yet, what is methodologically obscure is the operationalisation of governance through 
variables that are usually considered as explanatory or intervening variables within the semantic field. 
This misconception affects the clarity of the governance argumentation in a way that renders the 
relationship between governance and its sub-dimensions tautological. 
Moving up the ladder of abstraction (Sartori, 1970), the concept of governance confronts the notion 
of democracy. While the UN define governance as functional to implement democracy, some scholars 
claim indeed that democracy is a form of governance (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). As result of this 
conceptual hybridity, the indicators of governance reproduce a hybrid vision of democracy
6
 and its 
relationship with governance. Indices of governance usually incorporate measures of democracy (the 
Democracy Index is one of three measures used by the Bertelsmann Foundation to build the 
Sustainable Governance Indicators) and indices of democracy equally include aggregate measures of 
governance. Hence, comparing the categories
7
 of which some measures of governance and democracy 
are composed, the same underlining conceptualisations (and pillars) are used to capture the essence of 
both basic concepts.  
Continuing the move up the abstraction ladder, the concept of governance confronts the notion of 
international order and political regime. Yet, also the relationship between these concepts is unclear. 
The most important characteristic of governance should be the existence of most divers hierarchical 
and non-hierarchical modes of political steering as well as the non-centrality of the state. According to 
Rosenau, governance moreover underlies a form of political order (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992), a 
‘system of rules with transnational consequences’ (Rosenau, 1995). So, governance is also seen as a 
way of governmentalising international regimes (Zanotti, 2005) or even as the manifestation of a 
broader agenda composed of sectorial international regimes (Gehring, 1994). Within international 
relations, governance has also been defined as a by-product of the demise of traditional agency and 
authoritative rules (Finkelstein, 1995). However, there is no agreement on whether governance holds 
                                                     
6
 The Figure 1 displays this hybridity locating democracy in the middle between the basic conceptualisation and te upper 
level of abstraction. 
7
 For instance, the Democracy Index, provided by Economist Intelligence Unit presents 60 indicators grouped into 5 
pillars: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political 
culture. The Sustainable Governance Indicators compiled by Bertelsmann, aggregate three indices (Policy Performance, 
Governance and Democracy). 
GOVERNANCE 
DEMOCRACY 
CORRUPTION 
REGIME 
DEVELOPMENT 
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an intrinsic global connotation, or whether ‘global’ should be considered only one of the potential 
‘adjectives’8 of governance (Rosenau, 1995). 
Governance indicators, as result, partially have established a contradictory relationship with the 
supranational characteristic of the concept. Few attempts have tried to differentiate between ‘global’ 
and ‘national’ governance and classical authoritative methods of regulation. So, contrary to the 
globalisation discourse, an important trend of measuring governance was the embracing of the 
regional level within many regional measures of governance
9
.  
3. What do stateness indicators measures?  
The term ‘stateness’ refers to ‘the institutional centrality of the state’ (Evans, 1997), i.e. to the two 
basic conditions: the organisational capacity to formulate independent policies (Nettl, 1968), and a 
coherent institutional framework indispensable to promote social cohesion (Jessop, 1990)
10
. The latter 
two conditions presuppose, of course, the classical attribute of decisive control over the application of 
authorized force within the territory. While theorising the state is an arduous enterprise challenged by 
conceptual and theoretical complexities, many scholars and practitioners have approached the problem 
of state weakness through the lens of empiricism. In less than two decades, the state failure discourse 
has produced, at least, four variants of ‘low stateness’ (Evans, 1997). As illustrated in Table 5, the 
notions of state fragility, weakness, failures, and collapse, are used in parallel to frame the meaning of 
non-consolidated, low, or precarious stateness. As result, a variety of definitions and notions compose 
the matrix of this background concept.  
Table 5 Variants of low stateness: definitions 
Variant of  
‘low stateness’ 
Focus on Definitions 
Fragility Core functions ‘A State is fragile if the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the 
majority of its people, including the poor’ (DFID, 2005, p. 7). 
Weakness Critical 
government 
functions 
‘Inherently weak because of geographical, physical, or fundamental economic 
constraints; basically strong, but temporarily or situationally weak because of 
internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, despotism, or external attack; and 
a mixture of the two (Rotberg, 2003, p. 4) 
Failure The loss of the 
monopoly of 
violence 
‘Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by 
warring factions. In most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led 
by one or more rivals. Occasionally, the official authorities in a failed state face two 
or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, different degrees of communal 
discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the 
state’ (Rotberg, 2003, p. 5) 
Collapse Implosion 
 
‘A collapsed state is a rare and extreme version of a failed state. Political goods are 
obtained through private or ad hoc means. Security is equated with the rule of the 
strong. A collapsed state exhibits a vacuum of authority. It is a mere geographical 
expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen.’ (Rotberg, 2003, p. 5) 
                                                     
8
 The expression ‘with adjectives’ is used her to recall the methodological concern advanced by Collier and Levitsky 
(1997), to differentiate between democracy and its sub-dimensions.  
9
 Regional initiatives based on public perception of governance, include for instance the Eurobarometer, the European 
Values Study, the Asiabarometer, the Latinobarometer and the Afrobarometer. Proper measures of governance on the 
regional scale include indeed the more recent Ibrahim Index of African Governance (2008), the Index of African 
Governance (2008), and the African Integrity Indicators (2011).  
10
 The Weberian monopoly on the legitimate use of force is the fundamental characteristic of the state. However, the term 
stateness has been used by political theorists like Evans (1997), Nettle (1968) and Jessop (1991) to indicate the 
institutional centrality of the state. As result, the monopoly on the use of force is essential to define the state. But to 
define the institutionalisation of this monopoly, we have to consider other two categories, the organizational capacity, and 
the institutional coherence (ibidem). 
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The term ‘state fragility’ describes a general incapacity to ‘deliver core functions to the majority of its 
people, including the poor’(DFID, 2005, p. 7). ‘State weakness’ refers to the lack of essential 
capabilities to implement ‘critical government responsibilities’ (Rice & Patrick, 2008, p. 8). It yet also 
encompasses the incubation of ‘ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal tensions that have 
not yet, or not yet thoroughly, become overtly violent’ (Rotberg, 2003, p. 4). ‘State failure’ instead is 
‘a serious political crisis’ (Goldstone et al., 2000) marked by the escalation of a military conflict. The 
state fails when the central authority loses its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Rotberg 
described failed states as ‘tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring 
factions’ (Rotberg, 2003, p. 5). While ‘state weakness’ holds ‘a temporal or situational’ connotation 
(Goldstone et al., 2000), ‘state failure ’has a structural and enduring character. ‘State collapse’, finally, 
represents an extreme case of state failure, marked by the complete erosion of public authority and 
legitimacy. A collapsed state differs from a failed state in its institutional character (Milliken & 
Krause, 2002). When a state fails, the central authority is still existent, but extremely weak, whilst a 
state collapse reveals a ‘complete vacuum of authority’ (Rotberg, 2003, p. 5). 
3.1 Measures of stateness 
The connection between governance and democracy that informed the first generation of governance 
measures lost its centrality when the process of democratisation in Africa and Middle East revealed 
elements of uncertainty (Chesterman, Ignatieff, & Thakur, 2005). The production of governance 
indicators supported the positivist assumption of setting the benchmark and the stages of a linear patter 
of development. Yet, the limited achievements of the third wave of democratisation led many scholars 
and stakeholders to rethink the governance-democratisation nexus. The failure of states in Africa and 
Middle East was considered a crisis of governance (ibidem.), which reinforced the search for good 
governance instruments and early-warning indicators of state weakness. However, whereas the 
category of the ‘failed state’ emerged in reaction with the uncertainties posed by the process of 
democratisation, it was only with the declaration of the Global War on Terror, that the state failure 
paradigm became increasingly dominant, in both the academic and public debate. 
As result of these shifts, a number of new measures were produced and many projects focussed on 
measuring state capacities. While only little empirical evidence supported the formulation of the 
fragility-security nexus, a number of research projects tried to create early-warning instruments 
capable of bridging the gap between theory and practice (Carment, Prest, & Samy, 2009). Some of the 
most important measures of stateness are illustrate in Table 6. 
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Table 6 Measures of stateness 
 
 
One of the first aggregated measures of state weakness was inaugurated by the CIA in the early 1990s 
and launched by the Centre for Global Policy at George Mason University (Goldstone et al., 2010). It 
was the Political Instability Task Force (until 1994 named State Failure Task Force). The Task Force 
was created in response to the need of formulating Early Warning Research for U.S. Foreign Policy, 
especially in Africa. The task force annually produces four datasets on internal wars that are 
conceptualised as both forms of political instability and governance failure.  
In 2002, the WB started to rank fragile states within the Low-Income Countries Under Stress 
programme to identify countries that perform badly on two core dimensions (low income, and poor 
CPIA performances). The LICUS initiative was created to support WB decisions on investments in 
development countries affected by endemic crises (Carment et al., 2009).  
Rotberg provided one of the most important qualitative categorisation of state failure. In 2003, after 
five years of research on the Failed State Project at Harvard University, he defined the dividing lines 
between state collapse and general phenomena of state weakness. In 2004, the Fund for Peace 
launched the Failed States Index (renamed in 2014 into Fragile States Index), an annual index 
published by Foreign Policy, to establish a meaningful early warning mechanism, and effective policy 
responses to the problems of state fragility (The Fund for Peace, 2014). The index is based on 12 
indicators, created through means of content analysis, and calculated for 178 countries (edition 2014).  
The production of state failure measures particularly gained attention between 2007 and 2009: In 
2007, the Center for Systemic Peace and the Center for Global Policy at George Mason University 
jointly launched the State Fragility Index. In the same year, the Canadian International Development 
Agency commissioned the formulation of an Index of State Fragility by to the Carleton University in 
order to support capacity-building within the Canadian donor community. The index assesses the 
fragility of the state according to three criteria: the authority, the legitimacy, and the capacity of the 
state. The 2011 edition ranked 198 states using 83 indicators. In 2008, also the Brooking Institute 
published its first Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (Rice and Patrick, 2008), a multi-
dimensional index composed of 20 indicators, including 141 countries, and oriented to target 
especially the wider public. 
Index Provider Aim No. indicators Cover
age 
Country Indicators for 
Foreign Policy 
Fragility Index 
Carleton 
University 
Assist donor community. 83 183 
Low-Income Countries 
Under Stress 
World Bank To secure the Bank investment in 
development countries affected by a set 
of government and governance endemic 
crises (Carment et al., 2009) 
6 73 
Fragile States Index 
(until 2013, Failed 
State Index) 
Fund for Peace ‘To have meaningful early warning, and 
effective policy responses to the 
emerging problem of state fragility’(The 
Fund for Peace, 2014). 
12 178 
Index of State 
Weakness in the 
Developing World 
Brooking Institute Cognitive function: analyse the world’s 
most vulnerable countries.  
20 141 
State fragility Index George Mason 
University 
USAID’s request to better monitoring 
and manage the sources of state 
fragility. 
14 162 
Political Instability 
Task Force 
George Mason 
University 
Formulating early warning instruments 
for the US Foreign Policy. 
4 datasets, 1300 
variables ca. 
157 
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3.2 The semantic field of stateness 
Analysing the relationship between state fragility and a set of associated phenomena, the boundaries of 
the sematic field raise important questions. The first problem is related to the lack of a systematised 
concept within which the variants of low stateness were to be located. The lack of systematisation is 
rooted in the inconsistent theoretical status of the literature. The notions of state fragility and state 
weakness are rather ‘orphan’ concepts, detached from vital contributions made by social and political 
analyses to the theory of the state. Only few attempts were made to define the relationship between 
stateness and its interrelated dimensions. As a consequence, the literature has developed prototypes of 
state performance (Sanín, 2011a) that incorporate causes, symptoms (The Fund for Peace, 2014), and 
consequences of fragility into the same definitions. At the same time, also the relationship between the 
variants of low stateness is subject to different interpretations, and different terms are used to identify 
the same phenomena. For instance, many providers (Batley & Mcloughlin, 2010; DFID, 2005) use the 
term ‘fragility’ to define the ‘fundamental failure of the state’, without explaining why they use two 
different terms to represent, in the end, the same phenomenon. As a result of this differentiation and 
theoretical inconsistency, the academic literature has been trapped in subjective, judgemental 
(Gruffydd Jones, 2013; Menkhaus, 2010; Sanín, 2011b) and political (Barakat & Larson, 2014) 
connotations. 
Moving up the ladder of abstraction, the relationship between governance and stateness creates 
others problems. According to some scholars, the definition of good governance overlaps with the 
definition of state capacity (Hanson & Sigman, 2013), and the same dimensions or categories 
(Economic, Political, Social, Security) are employed to operationalise both the concepts. The Global 
Governance Report, recently released by the Hertie School of Governance (2014), for instance 
introduces the concept of ‘governance readiness’, to identify the ‘resilience and adaptiveness’ of 
private and public actors to create or maintain ‘the conditions in which problem-solving is possible as 
the resources of different state and non-state actors are brought together’(2014, p. 20). With the 
exception of security, the report equates the conditions for statehood with the ‘object’ of governance. 
The four conditions that governance should fulfil are the provision of welfare, infrastructure, 
sustainability, and societal integration. Hence, the concept of governance remains fundamentally state- 
and authority-centred, focussed on auxiliary and administrative functions of the classical state 
mechanisms to exercise power.  
As an overall consequence of the lack of theoretical specification, the semantic field of stateness 
remained opaque with both, its internal conceptual logics and its external definitional boundaries, 
especially in regional contexts, interpreted in different ways by different actor groups (Wolff, 2005).  
4. …How? Methodological considerations 
The current literature on indicators profoundly questions the overall quality of measurement activities 
(Galtung, 2006; Giebler, 2012), the selection of variables and indicators, the capacity of the selected 
indicators to capture the core concepts and, in some cases, even the reliability of aggregation methods 
employed. Key difficulties in measuring governance and stateness arise from a number of 
methodological aspects. However, much of the methodological issues with governance and stateness 
indicators are rooted in the conceptual challenge of operationalising these concepts in a valid, 
representative, and reliable way.  
The early measures of governance (WGI, ICRG, CPIA, CPI) faced the conceptual problem of 
measuring a phenomenon that was intrinsically ‘immeasurable’ (Bell & Morse, 2008). As a 
consequence, indicator providers created a set of methodological shortcuts to get to the ‘measurable’ 
core of governance. Yet, this way of proceeding was accompanied by two fundamental flaws: First, 
the use of proxies in itself questioned the measures’ capacity to fully capture the dimensions of 
governance. Second, also the use of subjective, i.e. perception data raised criticism. Subjective data 
were introduced into measuring governance in order to better frame the governance discourse, and to 
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solve the existent cognitive deficit. Governance emerged as an intangible concept and considering the 
difficulty of attributing to this concept a concrete and countable denotation, subjective indicators (such 
as perception surveys) were extensively used. Scholars however doubted the capacity of perception-
based indicators to correctly represent the phenomena under observation (Galtung, 1998) without 
being themselves biased by the judgment of business elite or experts asked (Andvig, Amundsen, 
Søreide, & Sissener, 2000). Perception-based indicators have moreover been criticised for their failure 
to generate replicable data that is indispensable for cross-countries comparisons.  
In response to these constraints of the first generation of governance indicators, the WB aimed for a 
second generation of indicators capable of creating more objective, nuanced, and contextualised 
solutions to the governance quests. According to Knack(2003), this second generation was foreseen to 
fill the gap between measures and policy decision-making, and to make indicators more politically 
acceptable and replicable. The methodological and ontological choices of that second generation 
hence emphasise the need to create more objective measures, the combination of multiple data 
sources, and the composition of multi-dimensional indices. 
As outlined above, in the 2000s, the proliferation of stateness indices intersected with the further 
advancement of such second generation governance indicators. Following Mata and Ziaja (2009), two 
defining trends of that period need to be mentioned: First, maximalist definitions of state fragility 
included ‘ideas of good governance, democratic rule and extensive public service provision’ and 
complicated ‘considerably the measurement of the phenomenon – [as] the more the state functions 
considered, the greater the variables and interdependencies to be controlled’ (Mata & Ziaja, 2009, p. 
14). Second, minimalist definitions oversimplified ‘the phenomenon and end[ed] up excluding 
elements that are crucial for validly representing a phenomenon’ (ibidem 2009, p. 14). 
Moreover, many stateness indices aggregated existent indicators and data sources in order to 
operationalise new concepts. While the governance and development debate collected new data, the 
majority of indices of state fragility use the existent empirical data pool created by the first (and later 
on also the second generation) of indicators. As result, this third generation of indicators, i.e. the set of 
stateness indicators, which emerged in the ‘2000s, condensed the characteristics11, virtues and fallacies 
of the governance and development measures in a dangerous mix of ontological and conceptual 
incongruences
12
. So, as a result of the continuous overlap between state and governance, input and 
output perspectives, measures of stateness use (and abuse) existing indicators of governance to 
account for the robustness of state institutions. Many providers have operationalised the quality of the 
rule of law by evaluating the administrative infrastructure of states, or their legal framework 
(considering for instance the legislature infrastructure, the provision of specific constitutional norms or 
particular pieces of legislation). At the same time, measures of administrative capacity were used to 
account for the fragility of institutions, without any differentiation between administrative 
infrastructure and capacity. The Failed States Index, for example, uses both WGI and ICRG variables 
to measure the progressive deterioration of state functions. While the WB’s LICUS initiative utilises 
CPIA ratings to determine the degree of state fragility. 
5. …Why? Normative demands and policy prescriptions 
Although development constitutes the key target of both initiatives to advance governance and 
stateness, measures of governance and state fragility have rarely been questioned in view of the 
                                                     
11
 Mata argues that the indicators used in these indices may also refer to input, process or outputs. They also comprehend 
subjective data based on experts’ opinion and objective data (Mata & Ziaja, 2009) 
12
 On the one side many of the existing indices are based on confused conception of state capacity. Methodological problem 
arise from the fact that ‘most fragility indices barely satisfy scientific standards”. They rely on expert assessments, fail to 
make careful choices about aggregation, and provide little information about scoring. Second, most fragility indices are 
based on overly broad conceptions of state fragility.  
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normative and policy prescriptions they exert on the development agenda. Both types of indicators are 
donor-serving concepts (Barakat & Larson, 2014) supporting a normative model focussed on the 
overall value of promoting democracy. When this prescription became a policy imperative (Boutros-
Ghali, 1995), the UN attributed the instrumental function of fostering good governance to democracy. 
This process was supported by the implementation of traditional regulatory instruments (adhering to 
international regimes), and by the formulation of new policy instruments, including ‘benchmarking, 
co-regulation, voluntary codes of conduct and negotiated agreements’ (Jordan, Wurzel, & Zito, 2005).  
The formulation of indicators capable of capturing the principles (inclusiveness, accountability, 
transparency, responsiveness, equity) or attributes (good, democratic, economic, corporate) of 
governance has been of paramount importance for the creation of the global governance model, as 
well for the reform of contemporary institutions and practices. Yet, despite the fact that both indicators 
of governance and stateness support a normative model focussed on the value of democracy, two 
specific prescriptive orientations need to be considered. 
5.1 Development prescriptions 
Since the emergence of the new donor enthusiasm in the 1990s, institutions and practitioners have 
used governance indicators to guide aid allocation, business investments and donor priorities. Many 
governments of donor countries and risk rating agencies rely on the WGI (originally created to 
evaluate the eligibility of developing countries for International Development Association (IDA) 
loans). The ‘performance based allocation’ (PBA), the system used to allocate IDA assistance, is 
calculated as a function of the country performance rating
13
, population and GNI (The World Bank, 
2007a). The country performance rating is built upon the aggregation of three indicators deriving from 
CPIA and the Annual Review of Portfolio Performance. The Millennium Challenge Account relies on 
17 indicators of governance quality divided into three categories (Ruling Justly, Encouraging 
Economic Freedom, and Investing in People). Of the 17 indicators, five derive from the WGI.  
Yet, doubts have been raised about the capacity of this ‘one-best-way model of governance’ 
(Andrews, 2010) to represent what good governance means, and requires, for different countries. Both 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of performance indicators and political conditionalities have been 
questioned as well. Developing countries have been the recipients of aid and loan strategies to improve 
their standards of governance. Nevertheless, in some cases the indicators employed to draft roadmaps 
to good governance lack the theoretical or empirical foundations to justify the recipes prescribed by 
the international organisations. In other cases, they are based on theoretical assumptions that have no 
relevance in developing countries (Andrews, 2008). Moreover, many have questioned whether the 
decisions taken based on governance indicators are more legitimate than decisions based on other 
processes. Throughout the 1990s, many influential practitioners such as the World Bank emphasised 
the role of political conditionalities in creating incentives for good governance. However, the 
empirical evidence forced scholars to recognise that conditionalities could have a potential and 
predictable negative impact on the integrity of the recipient countries (Knack, 2001), creating 
dependency syndromes and eroding the overall quality of governance (P. Collier, 1997).  
5.2 Neo-trusteeship prescriptions 
The model of democratic governance adopted in developing countries during the ‘90s, resulted in a 
‘governance crisis’ (Börzel, Pamuk, & Stahn, 2008). The reduction of the state to market-based 
mechanisms in conditions of precarious administrative infrastructures inhibited the formulation of 
indispensable development plans. Poor economic infrastructure, low investments and weak state 
architecture contributed to power distortions in many transition countries, i.e patrimonialism and 
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 The Country performance rating is equal to (0.8 *CPIA + 0.2* PORT) * (GOV/3.5).  
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predatory rule. This crisis induced international institution and practitioners to formulate new 
development and aid strategies. As outlined above, within this reorientation, the formulation of 
stateness indicators has been pivotal to capture a set of new challenges.  
If we yet consider the practice, and the rhetoric, of some of the most important development 
agencies or institutions, there is no agreement on the essence of state weakness (see above). However, 
there is agreement in assessing state weakness as a security problem for the stability of democratic and 
effective states (Carment, Samy, & Prest, 2008; Rice & Patrick, 2008). The USAID strategy, for 
instance, rather supports short-term solutions that mirror the strategic relevance fragile countries have 
for the US foreign policy (USAID, 2005). While USAID recognises the need to deal with long-term 
policy prescriptions, its operational choices seem to encourage shorter planning horizons to support 
rapid and effective responses (ibidem). DFID also focuses on short-term aims targeted at policy 
solutions for state fragility, or the delivery of essential state functions. DFID developed a guide for 
working in fragile contexts that substantially redefines assistance criteria towards peace-building and 
state-building concerns, supporting security reforms, as well as the development of formal systems of 
rules and laws. Since 2005, also the OECD Forum on Aid Effectiveness acknowledges the relevance 
of state fragility for aid effectiveness. Finally, a number of international organisation and 138 
countries signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness that recognises the need to adapt aid 
strategies to post-reconstruction and capacity-building priorities. 
In all of these contexts, indicators of stateness have been pivotal to capture the security risks and 
vulnerabilities of the state in context of fragility. Yet, they have also been of paramount importance to 
guide the formulation of specific priorities and donor methodologies (Paris Declaration, 2005). 
Indicators of state fragility have been especially essential to formulate a form of soft conditionality, 
using an ideal-type of state strength in order to guide aid and development policies. While classical 
forms of conditionality gradually lost importance, international practitioners promoted the use of 
flexible aid instruments that ‘mostly focus on objectives, policy actions and standards, but leaves 
government more discretion over what the aid is spent on and how it is managed’(Manuel, 
McKechnie, King, Coppin, & Denney, 2012, p. 10) in fragile state contexts . This soft mode, or 
positive conditionality, is built upon the respect of a set of criteria, like the harmonisation, ownership, 
alignment, and mutual accountability of the process (Paris Declaration, 2005). Yet, as stated in 
Overseas Development Institute’s paper for the OECD International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and 
Statebuilding Working Group on Aid, the entry conditionalities established under the Paris Declaration 
‘may relate to ethical standards (respect for human rights or democracy), public financial 
management, or the content of overall or sectoral strategy. They can also relate to bilateral objectives 
(supporting donor foreign policy positions)’(Manuel et al., 2012, p. 9). Addressing the normative 
context (‘ethical standards’), foreign policy decisions (‘supporting donor foreign policy positions’) and 
political economy choices (‘public financial management’), the new conditionalities hence also allow 
international stakeholders to preserve a significant control over domestic political authority.  
Considering this normative background, measures of stateness have been defined as neo-colonial 
instruments with neo-trusteeship characteristics (Caplan, 2007; Fearon & Laitin, 2004a), or those of 
postmodern imperialism (Fearon & Laitin, 2004a). According to Laitin and Fearon, t(Fearon & Laitin, 
2004a)he postmodern attribute better underlines the temporal horizon of policy options targeted to 
intervene in fragile state contexts. According to them, ‘the agents of neotrusteeship want to exit as 
quickly as possible, after intervening to reconstruct or reconfigure states so as to reduce threats arising 
from either state collapse or rogue regimes empowered by weapons of mass destruction’ (Fearon & 
Laitin, 2004b, p. 7). The short-term horizon of policy interventions in the context of fragility reveals 
the extent to which the solutions to counter fragility are focussed on filling, rather than fixing, the 
respective sovereignty deficit. 
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6. The Rule of Law Index, the Sustainable Governance Indicators and the State Fragility 
Index 
The present section analyses three distinct measures to describe some of the key characteristics of 
contemporary measures of governance and stateness. The measures under evaluation are The Rule of 
Law Index (World Justice Foundation), the Sustainability Governance Indicators (Bertelsmann 
Foundation), and the State Fragility Index (George Mason University).  
As summarised in Table 7, the three indices differ in a number of technical questions (coverage, 
aim, focus, numbers of variable and methodology), but they also share important elements of 
continuity. 
Table 7 Comparison between ROLI, SFI and SGI 
Criteria 
 
State Fragility Index 
(SFI)  
George Mason University 
Rule of Law Index  
(RoLI) 
World Justice Project 
Sustainable Governance 
Indicators (SGI) 
Bertelsmann Foundation 
Object ‘A country’s fragility is closely 
associated with its state 
capacity to manage conflict; 
make and implement public 
policy; and deliver essential 
services and its systemic 
resilience in maintaining 
system coherence, cohesion, 
and quality of life; responding 
effectively to challenges and 
crises, and continuing 
progressive development’ 
(Marshall & Cole, 2010, p. 7). 
Rule of Law (proxy of 
governance, input): ‘the 
system of rules and rights 
that enables fair and 
functioning societies’(The 
World Justice Project, 
2012b). 
Governance (input + output): 
the ‘government’s capacity to 
deliver sustainable policies 
(executive capacity) as well as the 
participatory and oversight 
competencies of actors and 
institutions beyond the executive 
branch (executive accountability)’ 
(Bertelsmann Foundation, 2014, p. 
14). 
Purpose Monitoring and managing 
sources of fragility 
Cognitive function Support OECD and  
EU sustainable policies 
No. of variables 14 47 150 
Coverage 162 99 41 (OECD and EU states) 
Data Objective Subjective Objective + Subjective 
Method Threshold standardisation Min-Max value Multilevel aggregation 
6.1 Demands and Purposes 
The three indices respond to different demands, and serve different purposes.  
The State Fragility Index (SFI) is a metric of political and economic instability that provides data 
about the level of instability for 162 countries (2011 edition). The development of the SFI was 
stimulated by USAID’s request to better monitor and manage causes of state fragility. The original 
initiative elaborated on the need to define the ‘prevailing perceptions of increasing global 
disorder’(Marshall & Cole, 2008) that emerged in the 2000s. The SFI forms part of the Global Report 
on Conflict Governance and State Fragility (Global Report), annually published by the Center for 
Global Policy at the George Mason University. The report claims that the Index is indispensable to 
define the challenges of the contemporary world order, and to analyse the overall systemic 
performance of states in the ‘era of dynamic globalization’ (ibidem). The index calculates state 
fragility though 14 indicators grouped under four dimensions: economic development, security, 
governance, and social development. Each indicator, however, is evaluated on the basis of two criteria 
(effectiveness and legitimacy) that are essential to capture the level of state strength or fragility.  
In 2010, the World Justice Project launched the Rule of Law Index (RoLI), an aggregate measure of 
the effective exercise of authority that can be considered as an approximation to the value of 
governance. The RoLI looks at a nation’s adherence to the rule of law from a societal perspective. 
This index also adheres to a cognitive function, i.e. the necessity to map the understanding and 
perception-based judgments of this concept. Yet, the Index also addresses a normative purpose, i.e. 
making ‘rule of law advancement as fundamental to the thinking and work of other professionals as it 
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is to lawyers and judges’ (The World Justice Project, 2012a). The key aim of the RoLI is to provide 
for a comprehensible and accessible diagnostic tool, capable to strengthen the rule of law worldwide 
and within states. It is not limited to the legal professional field, meaning that it does not exclusively 
targets lawyers and judges. The index is composed of 47 indicators grouped into nine clusters 
(Constraints on Government Powers, Absence of Corruption, Open Government, Fundamental Rights, 
Order and Security, Regulatory Enforcement, Civil Justice, Criminal Justice, Informal Justice), 
available for 99 countries. 
Since 2012, the Bertelsmann Foundation produces the Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI), a 
composite measure based on 43 governance indicators grouped in three dimensions/indices (Policy 
Performance, Democracy and Governance Indices). The indicators are available for the 41 OECD and 
EU countries. The 43 indicators used within the three indices are grouped in 13 clusters (Electoral 
process, Access to the information, Civil rights and political liberties, Rule of Law, Economic policies, 
Social Policies, Environmental Policies, Steering capability, Policy Implementation, Institutional 
Learning, Citizens, Legislature, Intermediary organisations). The SGI is a policy-oriented monitoring 
instrument with the specific aim to assist the EU and OECD in formulating and implementing 
sustainable policies (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2014). While the RoLI adheres to a normative priority, 
the SGI aims to configure precise policy solutions to governance issues.  
6.2 Concepts and definitions 
The three indices offer three different interpretations about what governance and stateness are, and 
about their interrelation.  
First, the Global Report presents one of the most articulated and well-defined meanings of state 
fragility. According to Marshall and Cole (2009), in order to evaluate the integrity of states, scholars 
should consider the interconnections between governance, conflict, and development. The index also 
sponsors the need to enhance a systemic analysis of global trends, contrary to focussing ‘exclusively 
on individual or dyadic (bilateral) analysis, that is, on the conditions relevant to a particular country or 
state or relative to the interactions of two’ (Marshall & Cole, 2008, p. 3). The report thus sheds more 
light on the relationship between concepts and phenomena, rather than formulating new definitions. 
Indirectly, it promotes a vision of democracy and autocracy as forms of governance, located at the 
opposite sides of a virtual governance spectrum. Governance, here, is considered one of the main 
criteria to calculate the fragility of the state. The SFI introduces also the important methodological 
innovation of considering state performance in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy. The index is also 
able to take into consideration how global trends affect state performance. 
Second, the RoLI represents a mono-dimensional measure of governance. Both the WB and Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation have incorporated the rule of law into their respective measures of governance 
(the WGI and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance). The World Justice Project has created a 
specific and innovative measure capable of capturing how the rule of law is experienced worldwide. It 
defines the rule of law as a system composed of four universal principles.
14
 Whereas the ‘system of 
rules’ implies that structural conditions are necessary to execute governance, the index actually 
systematises these four principles by exclusively using outcome indicators. It operationalises the index 
considering policy outcomes that the rule of law produces. These policy outcomes have been grouped 
in nine clusters
15
. 
                                                     
14
 The four principles are: ‘1) individuals and private entities are accountable under the law; 2) the laws are clear, 
publicized, stable, and just; are applied evenly; and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and 
property; 3) the process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, fair; 4) Justice is 
delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives and neutrals’ (World Justice Project, 2014, p. 4).  
15
 The constraints on government powers; absence of corruption; open government; fundamental rights; order and security; 
regulatory enforcement; civil justice; criminal justice; and informal justice (ibidem). 
Debora Valentina Malito 
18 
Third, for the Bertelsmann Foundation governance refers to the ‘government’s capacity to deliver 
sustainable policies (executive capacity) as well as the participatory and oversight competencies of 
actors and institutions beyond the executive branch (executive accountability)’ (Bertelsmann 
Foundation, 2014, p. 14). As result, governance is understood as part of the broader pattern of 
sustainability, which brings together both input and outcome indicators. The SGI is built on three 
indices of Democracy, Policy Performance, and Governance
16
. While the Democracy and Governance 
Indices use input and process measures of administrative capacity or democratic functioning, the 
Performance Index is based indeed on 16 policy outcomes variables (in matter of economic, social, 
and environmental policies).  
6.3 Data gathering and the quality of data 
Differences exist among the three examples also in view of the strategy adopted by the three providers 
to gather the necessary information and data. The RoLI is based on primary subjective sources, 
derived from two surveys (The General Pollution Poll and the Qualified Respondent’s Questionnaire), 
produced by the WJP for each country evaluated within the index. These two surveys collect a number 
of information concerning the experiences and perceptions of citizens and legal experts with the rule 
of law. 
The SGI uses both subjective and objective data. Hard data derive from Eurostat and the OECD. 
Yet, quantification is balanced by the formulation of country reports that synthesise the information 
provided by a pool of country experts responding to a specific questionnaire. The SFI employs only 
hard data. Each dimension of state fragility (security, political, social, and economic) presents both an 
effectiveness and legitimacy score that result from the aggregation of different data sources
17
.  
6.4 Standardisation 
In order to normalise data, the SFI uses a simple standardisation method, which establishes threshold 
values based on quintile cut-points. Nevertheless, from the document available online it is not possible 
to appreciate the transparency of the process. The Global Report mentions that the fragility score has 
been normalised with a set of threshold values, formulated on the baseline year 2004. However, no 
other information is available to evaluate the consistency of this procedure. On the contrary, the 
Bertelsmann Foundation and World Justice Project offer complete information about their 
standardisation process and methodologies. 
The RoLI relies on a simple normalisation, where the questions are first mapped by 47 indicators, 
and then codified by min-max values (0-1). Once normalised, the individual variables are integrated 
into sub-factors and factors, using simple averages. The same weight is assigned to questions 
(answers) formulated in the two datasets, the General Population Poll (QRQs) and the Qualified 
Respondents’ Questionnaires. 
The SGI presents a ‘multilevel aggregation’ (Schraad-Tischler, & Seelkopf, 2014) that combines 
both qualitative and quantitative information. In order to ensure the comparability of the data, the 
index standardises all the components through a linear function that transforms the value into a scale 
                                                     
16
 The Democracy Index is composed by 15 indicators grouped into 4 pillars (electoral process, access to information, civil 
rights and political liberties, Rule of Law). The Policy Performance Index is calculated on 16 variables grouped into three 
basic sectors (economic, social and environmental policy). The Governance Index is composed by 12 indicators, grouped 
into two pillars (Executive Capacity and Accountability). 
17
 Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset, the Political Terror Scales, Polity IV Project, Leadership Duration; Elite 
Leadership Coups datasets, World Development Indicators, Human Development Report; Structure of Trade; US Energy 
Information Administration, US Census Bureau and US Political Instability Task Force, UNDP Human Development 
Report, Religious Fractionalization dataset (Marshall & Cole, 2008). 
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ranging from 1 (min) to 10 (max). In order to ensure the comparability over time, also thresholds are 
calculated. The index is validated by adjusting the median (min and max value of the middle 50% of 
the distribution) by an amount equal to 1.5 times the interquartile range. The aggregation is made 
according to a scheme that aggregates data sources for each of the nine criteria (economic policies, 
social policies, environmental policies; electoral processes, access to information, civil rights and 
political liberties, rule of law; executive capacity, executive governance), attributing the same weight 
for both qualitative and quantitative data. In the same way, the score of each dimension, or index (the 
Policy Performance, Democracy and Governance) is produced. 
6.5 Criticisms 
Generally, the three indices face the common dilemma of measuring concepts that escape a clear 
conceptualisation, although they also contributed to filling parts of existent definitional and conceptual 
gaps. Yet, at the same time, they also contributed to complicating the ontological status of governance 
and stateness. The present section hence tests the validity (capacity of the indicator to represent the 
concept), reliability (the capacity to perform the required functions under different conditions and to 
returns the same results), and comparability (possibility to use the index for cross and within country 
comparisons) of these three measures. Table 8 summarises the major finding of this comparison, and 
the subjective values (on a 3-level scale) attributed to these findings.  
Table 8 Measuring the measures 
Criteria 
 
State Fragility Index  
(SFI)  
George Mason University 
Rule of Law Index  
(RoLI) 
World Justice Project 
Sustainable Governance 
Indicators (SGI)  
Bertelsmann Foundation 
Validity Low  
(objective data flawed concept) 
Medium  
(subjective data) 
High  
(subjective and objective data) 
Reliability Low 
(effectiveness and legitimacy) 
Medium  
(universal principles) 
High  
(sustainable governance) 
Comparability Across countries 
Within Counties 
Across countries 
 
Across countries 
Within Countries 
Updated 
information 
2011  
 
2014 2014 
Transparency Low  High High 
6.5.1 Internal Validity  
First, both the SGI and RoLI face the common criticism of using subjective data. However, the SGI 
balances this potential subjectivity bias by using also hard data derived from Eurostat and OECD 
datasets. For the RoLI, ‘sensitive questions may be perceived as threatening by government officials or 
by respondents. In the first case, government officials of certain countries may censor or condition the 
administration of questions because they are perceived as challenges to the regime’ (Botero & Ponce, 
2011, p. 23). This tendency produces a sort of bandwagon effect according to which some opinion 
may obfuscate the sincerity of the answer provided. This distortion is particularly significant when 
practitioners have to provide answers on the effectiveness of government, or levels of corruption. 
However, the WJP introduced an innovative research method, based on the idea of capturing the 
citizen perceptions about the rule of law. Contrary to this broader group, many of the governance 
indicators of the first generation are based on polls of experts or businessmen that ignored the 
perception of many other societal components.  
However, the use of ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ data is not sufficient to assess the internal validity of the 
indices. The SFI, for instance, relies exclusively on objective data, but the construction of the index 
relies on subjective assumptions, for two fundamental reasons. First, because state fragility is not a 
systematised concept, but remains entangled into judgemental (Gruffydd Jones, 2013; Menkhaus, 
2010; Sanín, 2011) and policy-oriented (Barakat & Larson, 2014) connotations. Second, indicators of 
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state fragility have created new categories according to specific policy meaning and interests. As noted 
by Ziaja (2012), the SFI does not provide a descriptive definition of state fragility, but rather only an 
operational one, distinguishing between two criteria (effectiveness and legitimacy) and four fields of 
applications (and respective economic, security, social, and political indicators). This operational 
definition results from the conceptual uncertainty, but is influenced also by the difficulty of collecting 
specific data on fragility. The SFI, as many of the state capacity measures, aggregates measures on the 
basis of existing indicators of governance and development (Ziaja, 2012). 
6.5.2 Reliability 
The three measures present different levels of reliability, i.e the ability of the index to perform its 
required functions under different conditions. In this context, both statistical and conceptual reliability 
should be considered. The conceptual reliability of governance and stateness measures is particularly 
important if we analyse the extent to which the operationalisation of concepts adhere to the reality of 
many developing countries. The Bertelsmann Foundation, for instance, does not provide evidence for 
the statistical reliability of the SGI. The index bypasses however, the potential problem of a low level 
of conceptual reliability, recognising that the challenge of sustainable governance rather affects the 
highly developed states of the OECD and the European Union. Therefore, the index is limited to the 
EU and OECD countries (41 states).  
RoLI and SFI are indices of global scale that face the dilemma of whether the criteria used to 
construct the indicators reflect visions of governance and stateness that may have different meanings 
across countries. The SFI does not mention the statistical reliability of the index, but the conceptual 
understanding raises two issues. First, the notion of state fragility adopted by the SFI tends to 
objectivise two theoretical categories, legitimacy, and effectiveness. These two categories have been 
formulated to capture a particular model of sovereignty, according to which the state is the 
organisation capable of monopolising the legitimate use of violence. Effectiveness and legitimacy 
constitute ideal types of sovereignty indispensable to approach the reality of the modern states. Yet, 
the seductive attempt to use such ideal types to create ahistorical and invariant causal analyses is at 
odds with the conceptual rationale of Weberian methodology that attributes an interpretative function 
to ideal types (Weber, 1991). Second, the definition of state fragility also tends to parameterise the 
relationship between one ideal-type of low stateness (state fragility) and the empirical reality. But this 
conceptual operation does not define the relationship between the other ideal types (strong stateness, 
for instance) and the empirical data. As result, only one typology of low stateness (state fragility) has 
been parameterised and transformed into a new phenomenon (the fragile state), that has been isolated 
from the conceptual understanding and historical, philosophical connotation of its original category, 
the state. 
From a methodological perspective, the WJP points out that the index holds a good level of 
reliability, because for seven of the nine dimensions, the statistical consistency measured with the 
Cronbach-alpha’s coefficient is at 0.90 (the threshold for an affordable aggregation is 0.7). Yet, if we 
question the definition of the Rule of Law provided by the World Justice Project, we could come to 
different conclusions about the conceptual reliability of the index. The WJP approaches the Rule of 
Law ‘in terms of the outcomes that the rule of law brings to societies – such as accountability, respect 
for fundamental rights, or access to justice’ (The World Justice Project, 2012b). This definition 
indirectly assumes the existence of an agreed-upon definition of the rule of law, or at least, that the law 
brings to different societies always the same kind of outcome. A deep disagreement exists between 
theorists and legal experts about the existence of such a universal connotation. The WJP assumes that 
four universal principles derived from international standards can account for the rule of law in any 
society. However, the operationalisation in terms of outcomes raises some ontological incongruence. 
First, it ignores the ‘tensions’ faced in the ‘overseas land’ (Costa & Zolo, 2007) where the concept of 
rule of law is a product of colonial importation. Second, it ignores how different forms of law (i.e. the 
case of Customary Law) are not quantifiable according to the same criteria used to evaluate the 
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effectiveness in western societies. The WJP’s definition indeed tends to standardise the outcomes that 
the rule of law brings in some countries (in the majority of them), without considering whether a 
universal principle is relevant or valid to capture the plurality of local information. As argued by 
Ringer, ‘The commitment to a conception of the rule of law in terms, roughly, of the number of courts 
per capita overlooks the importance of the interaction of state (i.e., “official”) courts with informal for 
a of dispute resolution, which are long-lived and vital parts of community life. Thus, “local” and 
“foreign” understandings of the rule of law will give rise to different descriptions and prescriptions for 
the problems’ (Ringer, 2014, p. 183). 
6.5.3 Comparability 
The quality of data employed also affects the comparability of the instruments, i.e. the possibility to 
use the indices for cross- and within-country comparisons. While the three indices allow for 
comparisons across countries, the RoLI, for instance, does not allow for within-country comparisons 
because the scores do not capture absolute values.  
The SGI allows for within-country comparisons. The methodology is supported by the 
implementation of the website’s interactive interfaces through which data is displayed in a very 
intuitive manner.  
The standardisation used for the SFI allows for comparisons over time, but the capacity of the 
index to provide for within-country comparison has been compromised by a set of factors. On the 
methodological side, many indicators are rescaled when new indicators are added, or new data for 
years became available. Moreover, scores of the matrix are not scaled according to a homogeneous 
numerical representation. While the majority of the indicators are rated according to a four-point scale 
(0= no fragility, 1= low fragility, 2 = medium fragility, and 3= high fragility), only one indicator 
(Economic Effectiveness) is rated on a five-point scale (the include also 4= ‘extreme fragility’). While 
the total Legitimacy and Effectiveness score are numerically represented, the matrix displays only the 
colour icons (green= 0, yellow=1, orange = 2, red= 3, black= 4) for eight indicators. Other three 
indicators are rated on a nominal (Regime Type and Regional Effects) and alphanumerical scale (Net 
Oil Production or Consumption) that contributes to the erosion of both the comparability and intuitive 
understanding of this instrument.  
7. Conclusion 
While there has been a profusion of governance and stateness measures, the concepts of governance 
and stateness remain vague and narrowly interpreted. Therefore, this paper emphasised the relevance 
of evaluating both the normative demands and the conceptual validity of the current measures. 
‘The first question that should occupy potential users of any governance indicator is not the size of 
the margins of error, but whether the indicators are valid measurements of what they purport to 
measure’ (Thomas, 2010, p. 37). On the contrary, many of the contemporary analyses hide behind 
technical issues a number of ideological and conceptual problems. This analysis shows that 
governance indicators do not always satisfy the standards of conceptual clarity, while stateness 
indicators are not theoretically defensible.  
The second question to be addressed when analysing indicators is how policy demands and 
normative prescriptions inform the construction of indicators. The study of indicators of governance 
has been limited to find descriptive solutions that have rarely attempted to explore the normative 
reasons guiding the numerical representation of political phenomena. The paper showed that both 
indicators of stateness and governance are donor-serving concepts (Barakat & Larson, 2014) 
indispensable to steer how states and institutions deal with the political crises that challenge the 
stability of the political order. During the 1990s, the crisis of governing stimulated the emergence of 
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the governance debate. Here a minimalist vision of the state sponsored policy reforms focussed on 
expanding the role of the market in government functions. While the (good) governance agenda was 
about ‘re-structuring the polity and politics’ (Börzel et al., 2008, p. 7), the state fragility discourse 
introduced the idea of re-structuring the state. The crisis of governance, in turn, forced the academic 
debate to rehabilitate the old state category, which has become the object of a new form of political 
conditionality.  
In conclusion, the third question to be addressed concerns the use and the implications of these 
indicators. There is broad disagreement and scepticism about the concrete capacity of these 
instruments to guide policy-making. Yet, the paper shows that these indicators have the intrinsic 
function of constructing the public discourse about governance and stateness. This function, in turn, 
holds the important implication of transforming the Western liberal categories of governance and 
liberal democracy into parameters of functioning of the contemporary political order. This outcome is 
not a mere ‘consolation prize’; it rather represents one of the most important materialisations of the 
soft form of power exercised by the indicators within the governance context.  
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